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INTRODUCTION
T he concept of the marketable pollution permit ("MPP")1 has be-
come an increasingly popular topic of discussion for environmen-
talists in recent years, although the idea has been in existence since at
least 1968, when J.H. Dales published a book on the issue.2 This ap-
proach was given added credibility when Congress enacted the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1990,3 which made the concept an official
part of environmental regulatory policy. A typical solution in this
area is for the government to mandate that a certain kind of pollutant
in a specified geographic area be reduced by a defined target percent-
age within a certain time period. Essentially, such nostrums are based
on a centralized command system rather than the market place.
Establishing a market in tradeable pollution permits triggers
"quasi" market forces. This leads to a more efficient allocation of re-
sources than traditional command and control alternatives and makes
it possible to achieve the goal of reducing emissions at a lower cost.
Firms that cannot achieve the targeted level can purchase a permit
from the party whose reduction exceeds the mandated amount. As
such, there is an incentive for each party to reduce pollution below the
* Robert W. McGee is a professor at the W. Paul Stillman School of Business,
Seton Hall University.
** Walter E. Block is a professor in the economics department of the College of
the Holy Cross. The authors would like to thank Vivian Lugo and John Tortora for
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1. This scheme also goes by the names tradeable emission rights ("TERs"),
tradeable pollution rights ("TPRs") and tradeable emission permits ("TEPs").
2. JOHN H. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY & PRICES (1968). Other treatises on
this subject include: BUYING A BETrER ENVIRONMENT: COST-EFFECTIVE REGULA-
TION THROUGH PERMIT TRADING (Erhard F. Joeres & Martin H. David eds., 1983);
THOMAS H. TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING: AN EXERCISE IN REFORMING POLLU-
TION POLICY (1985); Robert W. Hahn, Innovative Approaches for Revising the Clean
Air Act, 28 NAT. RESOURCES J. 171 (1988).
3. Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990). These amendments modified the
Clean Air Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988). Previous acts included the Air
Pollution Control Act of 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322 (1955); the Clean Air
Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963); and the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970), among others.
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legally required level so that the permits not being utilized can be
sold.
However, this solution has encountered some problems. Excessive
regulations and regulator attitudes have essentially destroyed the
evolution of a well-functioning permit market. Furthermore, as pres-
ently advocated and applied, the system is structurally unsound; since
it places reliance on command rather than market incentives-which
is really just a form of market socialism, a system that von Mises4 -and
Hayek5 criticized in the 1920s and 1930s.6
This Article applies market theories to the problem of pollution.
Accordingly, it maintains that while market socialism (e.g., tradeable
emission rights) is preferable to central commands, a system of fully
protected private property rights is superior: to both.
I. THE POLLUTION TRADING PERMIT APPROACH
Strictly speaking, there are two economic systems, the capitalist
market system and socialism. Capitalism relies on voluntary exchange
and the recognition of property rights. The socialist alternative relies
on force or the threat of force and therefore necessarily entails the
violation (or nonrecognition) of property rights. The market system
has been shown to be more effective in allocating scarce resources for
a number of reasons.7 It relies on a price system, that acts as a signal-
ling mechanism to convey information to market participants.8 Social-
ism, on the other hand, relies on centrally directed command.
4. Ludwig von Mises, Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth, in
COLLECTIVIST ECONOMIC PLANNING 87 (Friedrich A. Hayek ed., 1935) [hereinafter
Economic Calculation]; LUDWIG VON MISES, SOCIALISM: AN ECONOMIC AND SOCIO-
LOGICAL ANALYSIS (1951) [hereinafter SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS].
5. Friedrich A. Hayek, The Nature and History of the Problem, in COLLECTIVIST
ECONOMIC PLANNING 1 (Friedrich A. Hayek ed., 1938); Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use
of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945), reprinted in THE ESSENCE
OF HAYEK 211 (Chiaki Nishiyama & Kurt R. Leube eds., 1984); FRIEDRICH A.
HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER (1948); Friedrich A. Hayek, The
Pretence of Knowledge, Nobel Memorial Lecture delivered in Stockholm, (Dec. 11,
1974), in LES PRIX NOBEL EN 1974 (1975) and in THE ESSENCE OF HAYEK 266
(Chiaki Nishiyama & Kurt R. Leube eds., 1984).
6. For a more recent exposition on the inefficiency of market socialism, see
ANTHONY DE JASAY, INST. OF ECON. AFF., MARKET SOCIALISM: A SCRUTINY 'THIS
SQUARE CIRCLE' (1990); HANS-HERMANN HOPPE, A THEORY OF SOCIALISM AND
CAPITALISM: ECONOMICS, POLITICS AND ETHICS (1989).
7. We will not go into a detailed review of the empirical evidence to support this
position. Even a cursory look at the effects that a socialist economic system has had
on the former Soviet Union and the states in Eastern and Central Europe will con-
vince all but the most devoted socialist that the market system does a better job of
creating wealth and allocating resources than does socialism. For reasons supporting
this premise, see THE MARKET SOLUTION To ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN EASTERN
EUROPE (Robert W. McGee ed., 1992); SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 4.
8. Any price theory text provides a detailed explanation of how the price system
works. Microeconomic texts also devote substantial space to the workings of the
price system.
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However, because the information is so broadly disseminated, it is im-
possible for a central authority to gather and digest the information
essential to decisions resulting in the efficient allocation of resources.
Yet, the market system performs this function automatically. A
number of commentators have discussed this phenomenon in depth,
so there is no need to repeat it here.9
Until recently, the command system ,was used almost exclusively to
control pollution. As a result of the shortcomings of that system, the
problem still exists. However, researchers are currently trying to find
ways to inject market forces into the area of pollution abatement, rec-
ognizing the effectiveness of this approach over central planning.
One way to unleash market forces is by the use of tradeable emis-
sions rights ("TERs"), which are permitted under the 1990 Clean Air
Act Amendments. Under a command system, all businesses and com-
munities would have to collectively and individually meet whatever
tests and pollution reductions government commanded, while under a
market permit trading system, reduction goals could be achieved more
flexibly. For example, suppose a hypothetical law required all electric
power plants to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions by. thirty percent over
a two-year period and that the decrease would have to be achieved by
using smokestack scrubbers. Under the command system, every
power plant would have. to achieve the thirty percent reduction re-
gardless of cost. Plants with older: technology might find it very diffi-
cult and expensive to meet the target. Newer ones might achieve it at
a much lower cost.
However, under a market-driven system, the goal could be achieved
more efficiently. Here, the goal could still be a thirty percent overall
reduction, but individual plants would have more flexibility in trying
to meet it. They could each try to find the least costly way to achieve
the goal. Assume that there are ten power plants of equal size in the
region producing a total of 100 million tons of emissions, or 10 million
tons each.' ° Under a permit trading regime, plants have several op-
tions. While the total emission, reduction must be 30 million tons, the
individual plants do not necessarily have to use scrubbers to achieve
their allocable share of the reduction. They can use ,other means if
they can find a better way. For example, they might be able to switch
from burning coal to using natural gas, electricity or water power. Or
they might find ways to burn their coal more efficiently. The price
9. See supra notes 4 and 5; THOMAS SOWELL, KNOWLEDGE AND DECISIONS
(1980).
10. Cf. BRUCE YANDLE, NATIONAL CHAMBER FOUNDATION, A PRIMER ON MAR-
KETABLE POLLUTION PERMITS (1991). The Clean Air Act Amendments call for a
50% reduction in sulfur dioxide emissions.
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system will send them the signals they need to make the correct
decision.1
However, under a permit trading regime, each plant does not have
to achieve a thirty percent reduction. Efficient plants could find ways
to reduce their emissions by forty percent, and could sell their excess
ten percent to one that is having difficulty achieving its thirty percent
required reduction. In effect, efficient plants could sell pollution
"rights" to their inefficient colleagues. Clearly, because of this market
incentive, efficient plants might find it profitable to reduce emissions
in their facility by more than that required by law so that they could
sell their right to pollute to someone else. For example, if a plant
could reduce its emissions by an extra ton at a cost of $300 and could
sell this pollution right for $1000, the incentive to reduce emissions
would result in turning liabilities and expenses into assets and reve-
nues. If the price of MPPs becomes sufficiently attractive, some pol-
luters may find it more profitable to shut down their facility and sell
their permits than to remain open. This is a further incentive that
does not exist under a command system.
Moreover, pollution could also be reduced by another market force.
Environmental groups could use the funds they now expend on litiga-
tion, public relations and advertising to purchase some emission rights
themselves. If such groups bought ten percent of the total permits in
an area and then simply declined to resell them, total pollution could
be reduced by that amount. These organizations might even be able
to increase the amount of private funding they receive (thus making
more funds available for buying yet additional trading permits) if they
engaged in this kind of activity, since some individuals hesitate to con-
tribute to them now because the motives of some environmental
groups are suspect.12
If it appears that MPPs are a good investment, speculators might
enter the market and purchase some permits in the hope that the price
would rise. While they are waiting, the permits lie dormant, which
also would serve to reduce discharges. 13
Once these quasi-market forces are allowed to function, mutually
beneficial exchange will trigger the free enterprise system to find new
11. Economists sometimes say that the price system sends signals to convey infor-
mation to the marketplace. What this suggests is that the market ranks alternatives in
terms of a common denominator-price. For example, if a particular company could
achieve its pollution reduction goal by using scrubbers (at a cost of $10) by switching
to natural gas (at a cost of $20), or by burning coal more efficiently (at a cost of $30),
it will choose to use scrubbers because this is the lowest cost alternative.
12. Some potential contributors avoid environmental groups because of the per-
ception that they are utopians, crackpots or anti-free enterprise. This view would
change if these groups could show, by their actions, that they use their funds to reduce
pollution rather than dismantle the free enterprise system through excessive regula-
tion and litigation.
13. YANDLE, supra note 10, at 10.
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ways to achieve goals at minimum cost. Specialization and division of
labor, coupled with the unanticipated discovery of more efficient pro-
duction methods will expand the market, causing benefits to increase
and costs to fall. According to one conservative estimate, adopting
the trading permit approach to sulfur dioxide emissions in the United
States may lead to as. much as a twenty percent decline in electric
utility costs over what would have been the case under a command
system. 14
Several studies have found that changing from commands to mar-
kets can produce dramatic cost reductions. Below are summaries of
some empirical studies of air pollution control.' 5
Percent Cost
Pollutant Industry Reduction
Particulates Power 83%
Sulfur dioxide Power 50%
Sulfates Steel, Petroleum, Power 9%
Nitrogen oxide Steel, Chemicals, Oil 83%
Hydrocarbon DuPont Chemical 76%
Particulates All sources 76%
CFC Refrigeration (plastics) 50%
Sulfur dioxide Power 77%
Nitrogen oxide Power, Steel, Oil 93%
Sulfur dioxide Power, Steel, Oil 44%
Particulates Power, Steel, Oil 95%
Another advantage for markets over command systems concerns
the behavior of managers. Rather than spending their time and effort
dealing with government bureaucrats and trying to manipulate the
system to their advantage, managers can utilize their resources and
energy to develop more efficient ways to run their businesses. Thus,
while a command system rewards politically gifted managers, the mar-
ket system rewards production and results. Over time, this difference
in incentives produces a new managerial breed. Entrepreneurial man-
agers tend to take the place of bureaucrats, and bureaucrats tend to
change into entrepreneurial managers.
II. A PROPERTY RIGHTS APPROACH
While marketable trading permits are a definite improvement over
commands, they can be criticized on a number of counts.' 6 One fault
14. Id. at 6. This estimate is conservative because it does not take into account the
fact that market forces, over time, will continue to push down costs as a result of the
discovery of new techniques.
15. See id. at 9a (summary of these studies).
16. See, e.g., TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRON-
MENTALISM (1991), especially 147-51, 158-59; ANNE SHOLTZ & KENNETH CHILTON,
CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF AM. Bus., ACID RAIN AND TRADEABLE PERMITS: How
CONGRESS HOBBLES THE POWER OF THE MARKETPLACE, Occasional paper 83 (1990).
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is that government diminishes the effectiveness of the permit trading
system through regulation, 7 which replaces the market with a bureau-
cratic command structure. As a result, whenever there is a "failure,"
it is labeled a "market failure," when in fact it is a governmental fail-
ure.18 Another difficulty is that if we took the Project 88 approach' 9
in a world of pervasive externalities, there would be a need for
thousands of government-created and monitored markets for specific
pollutants such as SO2, CO, CO 2, particulates, NO and NO 2, not to
17. For a specific discussion on this point, see Robert W. Hahn & Roger G. Noll,
Barriers to Implementing Tradable Air Pollution -Permits: Problems of Regulatory In-
teractions, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 63 (1983); Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L.. Hester,
Where Did All The Markets Go? An Analysis of EPA's Emissions Trading Program,
6 YALE J. ON REG. 109 (1989).
18. See THE THEORY OF MARKET FAILURE: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION (Tyler
Cowen ed., 1988); Charles Wolf,, Jr., Market and Non-Market Failures: Comparison
and Assessment, 7 J. PUB. POL'Y 43-70 (1987). The theory of market failure involves a
non sequitur, which is defined as "a conclusion or inference that does not follow from
the premises" or evidence upon which it is based. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTION-
ARY 924 (3d College ed. 1988). If the market fails to do something that someone
thinks it should do, it is called a market failure. The conclusion often drawn is that
government needs to intervene in such cases. But it does not follow that government
must intervene because government intervention may be worse than doing nothing at
all. For examples of government failure in the area of the environment, see THE
YELLOWSTONE PRIMER: LAND AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN THE GREATER
YELLOWSTONE ECOSYSTEM (John A. Baden & Donald Leal eds., 1990). In some
cases, there is evidence to suggest that government involvement has been harmful
rather than beneficial. See Alston Chase, Sometimes What Threatens Our Parks Is the
Park Service, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 1986, at 30 (government management policy re-
sulted in wildlife disasters); Timothy Egan, Forest Service Abusing Role, Dissidents
Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1990, at L1, col. 5 (Forest Service is the major. cause of
deforestation); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RANGELAND MANAGEMENT:
FOREST SERVICE NOT PERFORMING NEEDED MONITORING OF GRAZING ALLOT-
MENTS, GAO/RCED-91-148, May 1991 (Forest Service responsible for overgrazing);
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RANGELAND MANAGEMENT: CURRENT
FORMULA KEEPS GRAZING FEES Low, GAO/RCED-91-I85BR, June 1991 (abnor-
mally low' grazing fee policy leads to overgrazing). Not too many years ago, some
environmentalists would blame pollution and environmental degradation on the capi-
talist countries in the West. But in the last few years, it has become apparent that the
centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe have been even bigger
environmental offenders. See, e.g., THOMAS DILORENZO, CENTER FOR THE STUDY
OF AM. Bus., DOES CAPITALISM CAUSE POLLUTION? (1990); MURRAY FESHBACH &
ALFRED FRIENDLY, JR., ECOCIDE IN THE USSR: HEALTH AND NATURE UNDER
SIEGE (1992). In fact, it might be reasonable to conclude that the adoption of a mar-
ket economic system (with property rights) could be beneficial to the environment,
since countries with free enterprise tend to have less pollution than countries with
centrally planned economies. For example, in Katowice, Poland, one of Eastern Eu-
rope's most polluted cities, pollutant emissions dropped about 50% since the intro-
duction of a market economy. See Peter Furhman, Breathing the Polish Air, FORBES,
June 24, 1991, at 40. Could it be that environmental quality and economic growth' are
mutually dependent rather than mutually exclusive?
19. PROJECT 88:. HARNESSING MARKET FORCES To PROTECT OUR ENVIRON-
MENT: INITIATIVES FOR THE NEW PRESIDENT (1988) (a public policy study sponsored
by Senator Timothy E. Wirth and Senator John Heinz). The second volume was pub-
lished as PROJECT 88-ROUND II: INCENTIVES FOR ACTION: DESIGNING MARKET-
BASED ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGIES (1991).
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mention the hundreds of "toxics" that are regulated one way or an-
other. Also, at present there are no proposals to allow cross-trading of
different sorts of pollution permits, and there will be great restrictions
on the marketability of rights of the same sort by geography.20 Thus,
great rigidities would be introduced into the process. For example, we
could not take advantage of a drop in the seriousness of acid rain be-
cause the political process moves too slowly. The result is an imposi-
tion of an increasing series of side constraints on an economy with the
potential of enormous cross-trade benefits (such as more NOx and less
ozone) but no ability to take advantage of these benefits. 21 Such gov-
ernmental failures are endemic to the system.
To state this criticism in Coasian terms, the problem is that markets
have more to do with the terms of trade and the opportunity of creat-
ing new linkages and new tradeoffs than with the production of a rigid
bundle of nontradeable goods. Coase's "problem of social cost ' 22 is
relevant to this entire debate but has yet to be understood by the mar-
ket socialist school and environmentalists.
Yet, perhaps the major fault with trading permits is that, while they
allow market forces to allocate resources, they entail a fundamental
and pervasive violation of property rights. In reality, MPPs are
licenses to pollute, licenses that can violate property rights. Thus,
trading permits are a form of market socialism because they allow
market forces to operate yet ignore property rights. Martin Anderson
expresses the following view:
Fortunately, there is a simple, effective approach available-long
appreciated but underused. An approach based solidly on ... pri-
vate property rights.
At its root all pollution is garbage disposal in one form or an-
other. The essence of the problem is that our laws and the adminis-
tration of justice have not kept up with the refuse produced by the
exploding growth of industry, technology and science.
If you took a bag of garbage and dropped it on your'neighbor's
lawn, we all know what would happen. Your neighbor would call
the police and you would soon find out that the disposal of your
garbage is your responsibility, and that it must be done in a way that
does not violate anyone else's property rights.
But if you took that same bag of garbage and burned it in a back-
yard incinerator, letting the sooty ash drift over the neighborhood,
20. This is because the impact a specific pollutant has varies by region.
21. Another problem with permit trading is that it might cause pollution to be-
come concentrated in certain areas and result in abnormally high levels of pollution if
the firms in a particular area purchase excessive permits. For a discussion of the rem-
edies such victims might be able to receive and how they might recover, see Note, A
Remedy for the Victims of Pollution Permit Markets, 92 YALE L.J. 1022 (1983).
22. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960), re-
printed in RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW 95 (1988).
There is a strong case to suggest that there is no such thing as "social cost." See
STEVEN N. S. CHEUNG, THE MYTH OF SOCIAL COST (1978).
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the problem gets more complicated. The violation of property
rights is clear, but protecting them is more difficult. And when the
garbage is invisible to the naked eye, as much air and water pollu-
tion is, the problem often seems insurmountable.
We have tried many remedies in the past. We- have tried to dis-
suade polluters with fines, with government programs whereby all
pay to clean up the garbage produced by the few, with a myriad of
detailed regulations to control the degree of pollution. Now some
even seriously propose that we should have economic incentives, to
charge polluters a fee for polluting-and the more they pollute the
more they pay. But that is just like taxing burglars as an economic
incentive to deter people from stealing your property, and just as
unconscionable.
The only effective way to eliminate serious pollution is to treat it
exactly for what it is-garbage. Just as one does not have the right
to drop a bag of garbage on his neighbor's lawn, so does one not
have the right to place any garbage in the air or the water or the
earth, if it in any way violates the property rights of others.
What we need are tougher clearer environmental laws that are
enforced-not with economic incentives but with jail terms.
What the strict application of the idea of private property rights
will do is to increase the cost of garbage disposal. That increased
cost will be reflected in a higher cost for the products and services
that resulted from the process that produced the garbage. And that
is how it should be. Much of the cost of disposing of waste is al-
ready incorporated in the price of the goods and services produced.
All of it should be. Then only those who benefit from the garbage
made will pay for its disposal.23
A true market system would include both components-a price sys-
tem and recognition of property rights. Thus, TERs alone are an in-
complete solution. There is, however, a true market solution that
depends on the price system without violating property rights. The
first step is to establish a system of clearly defined and enforceable
property rights.24 Once clearly defined, market forces will take over
and determine the optimal level of pollution. If a firm creates pollu-
tion without first entering into an agreement, or if the parties cannot
23. Martin Anderson, George Bush Environmentalist, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Jan. 4, 1989, at 19, cited in Walter Block, Preface to ECONOMICS AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: A RECONCILIATION at ix-x (Walter Block ed., 1990).
24. Nuisance, trespass, negligence and strict liability are all possible approaches to
achieve a just result, depending on the facts and circumstances in each case. How-
ever, the key to any recovery is a clearly-defined system of property rights. Julian
Conrad Juergensmeyer discusses these four avenues of recovery in Control of Air
Pollution Through the Assertion of Private Rights, 1967 DUKE L.J. 1126 (1967). Rich-
ard Epstein develops a substantive law of nuisance based on the assumption that cases
should be decided solely with reference to the principles of corrective justice: "ren-
dering to each person whatever redress is required because of the violation of his
rights by another." Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utili-
tarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 50 (1979).
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come to an agreement fixing the cost and degree of pollution, then the
court system could be used to assess damages. Such a system provides
an incentive for companies to reduce the amount of discharge or bear
the full cost of their actions.25
This system was prevalent in the United States until the nineteenth
century.26 Then, in a series of nuisance cases, individual property
rights were denied when the courts sided with the violators of those
rights.27 For example, in Ryan v. New York Central Railroad Co.,
28
25. Some economists point out that another method by which offenders would be
forced to pay the full cost of their actions would be to impose a tax. See WILFRED
BECKERMAN, PRICING FOR POLLUTION: MARKET PRICING, GOVERNMENT REGULA-
TION, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1990). But this solution suffers from several defects,
the most important one being that taxation does not compensate the victims. While
taxes can alter behavior, any funds that are raised go to the government, not the
victims. Moreover, taxing the perpetrators does not necessarily reduce the amount of
effluents; it merely raises the cost, while permitting them to continue to violate the
property rights of the victims. For economic critiques that point out the advantages of
imposing taxes on polluters, see A.V. KNEESE & C.L. SCHULTZE, POLLUTION, PRICES,
AND PUBLIC POLICY (1975). For a treatise that is critical of using taxes to regulate
pollution, see Dwight R. Lee, Rent-Seeking and Its Implications for Pollution Taxa-
tion, 51 S. ECON. J. 731 (1985), reprinted in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RENT-
SEEKING 353 (Charles K. Rowley et al. eds., 1988).
Using taxes to regulate pollution also suffers from a theoretical flaw. Since all costs
are private and therefore subjective, there is no way to aggregate costs of different
individuals to arrive at some optimal social cost or to determine an appropriate tax.
LUDWIG VON MISES, EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF ECONOMICS 165 (George
Reisman trans., 1976). Although it makes no sense to speak about externalities that
generate a divergence between private and social costs, that is the argument econo-
mists often make for imposing an excise tax on energy. While negative externalities
should concern policymakers, it is not because they cause private and social costs to
diverge, but because they impose private costs on nonconsenting parties. Thus, there
is no way to arrive at Pareto optimality. Even if there were, it would be possible only
for an instant because conditions and knowledge change over time, rendering even a
temporarily optimal tax inefficient. Roy E. Cordato discusses these weaknesses in-
herent in energy taxes in Subjective Value, Time Passage, and the Economics of Harm-
ful Effects, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 229 (1989); see also Excises, Social Costs, and the
Myth of Efficient Taxation: The Case of Carbon Taxes, IRET POLICY BULLETIN No.
56, July 3, 1992; see also RoY CORDATO, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND EXTERNALITIES
IN AN OPEN ENDED UNIVERSE: A MODERN AUSTRIAN PERSPECTIVE (1992).
26. For a detailed account of this system, see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANS-
FORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977).
27. For a discussion of how court holdings in nuisance cases led to a disparage-
ment of property rights, see Murray N. Rothbard, Law, Property Rights, and Air Pol-
lution, 2 CATO J. 55 (1982), reprinted in ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A
RECONCILIATION 233 (Walter Block ed., 1990). For applications of private nuisance
law to air pollution, see William C. Porter, The Role of Private Nuisance Law in the
Control of Air Pollution, 10 ARIZ. L. REV. 107 (1968); see also Julian C. Ju-
ergenmeyer, Control of Air Pollution Through the Assertion of Private Rights, 1967
DUKE L.J. 1126 (1967).
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1066 (6th ed. 1990) splits nuisances into two main cate-
gories, nuisance in fact and nuisance per se. It defines nuisance in fact as "[aicts,
occupations or structures which are not nuisances per se but may become nuisances
by reason of the circumstances of the location and surroundings . . . ." Id. (citations
omitted). BLACK'S defines nuisance per se as "[a]n act, occupation, or structure which
is a nuisance at all times and under all circumstances, regardless of location or sur-
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sparks from a locomotive caused a house to burn down. The court
held that the railroad was not liable for the damages, regardless of the
causation, because "[in a commercial country, each man, to some ex-
tent, runs the hazard of his neighbor's conduct, and each, by insurance
against such hazards, is enabled to obtain a reasonable security against
loss."29 Although the railroad was the obvious cause of the damage, it
was not made to bear the financial cost incurred as a result of its
actions.3o
Undoubtedly, the policy rationale was that it is better that a few
farmers go uncompensated than that trains stop running or be forced
to pay the full cost of their operation. 31 This position, of course, re-
roundings" Id. (citations omitted) and "as, things prejudicial to public morals or dan-
gerous to life or injurious to public rights; distinguished from things declared to be
nuisances by statute, and also from things which constitute nuisances only when con-
sidered with reference to their particular location or other individual circumstances."
Id. (citations omitted).
28. 35 N.Y. 210 (1866).
29. Id. at 217.
30. Sometimes, judges look to the social value of the activity or offender when
making their determination as to liability. Factories, smelters, oil refineries, noisy ma-
chinery, airports, and blasting have social utility, whereas foul ponds and vicious or
noisy dogs do not. Of course, this view ignores individual rights and fundamental
fairness- Nevertheless, this is the approach courts often take. For cases on these
points, see, e.g., Monroe Carp Pond Co. v. River Raisin Paper Co., 215 N.W. 325
(Mich. 1927) (factory); Daughtry v. Warren, 85 N.C. 136'(1881) (factory); Clifton Iron
Co. v. Dye, 6 So. 192 (Ala. 1889) (smelter); Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper &
Iron Co., 83 S.W. 658 (Tenn. 1904) (smelter); Helms v. Eastern Kansas Oil Co., 169 P.
208 (Kan. 1917) (oil refinery); Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., 173 A. 627 (R.I. 1934)
(oil refinery); Gilbert v. Showerman, 23 Mich. 448 (1871) (noisy machinery); Antonik
v. Chamberlain, 78 N.E.2d 752 (Ohio Ct. App. 1947) (airports); Booth v. Rome, W. &
O.T.R. Co., 35 N.E. 592 (N.Y. 1893) (blasting); Hosmer v. Republic Iron & Steel Co.,
60 So. 801 (Ala. 1913) (foul pond); Hubbard v. Preston, 51 N.W. 209 (Mich. 1892)(dog).
The whole concept of "public policy" suffers from major structural weaknesses be-
cause it is based on utilitarianism-the greatest good for the greatest number. Since
there is no way to measure utility, it is not possible to determine whether a particular
public policy should be using a utilitarian approach, even if the goal is to adopt a
policy that maximizes societal benefits. Thus, the legal system and policymakers are
forced to rely on majoritarianism without regard to individual rights. Courts have
ruled that a few farmers must have their property rights violated so that railroads can
continue to spew sparks on their land because of some overall benefit to society.
Courts have adopted this "balancing" concept to arrive at decisions in a number of
areas. But once it is seen that the balancing argument is just another positive rights
argument, the argument falls apart. For more on this point,' see Ronald A. Cass, The
Perils of Positive Thinking: Constitutional Interpretation and Negative First Amend-
ment Theory, 34 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1405 (1987); Robert W. McGee, The Right To Not
Associate: The Case for an Absolute Freedom of Negative Association, 23 U. WEST
L.A. L. REV. 123,136-42 (1992).
31. Ronald Coase presents a detailed discussion of farmers and locomotive sparks
in his .classic article, Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 22. However, he
takes a cost-benefit position rather than one based on rights. His view is that the
railroad should compensate the farmer for his loss in some cases but not in others,
depending on the relative costs-and benefits. This position suffers from a number of
flaws. For one thing, it is impossible to measure costs and benefits because all such
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suited in a basic violation of property rights, because farmers were
suffering financial damage but were not compensated. It was a classic
example of what public choice economists call "rent seeking, '32 since
some groups (farmers in this case) were forced to pay for the benefits
of other groups (railroad owners). If courts had held in favor of the
farmers instead, railroad owners would have been forced to find a way
to reduce the amount of sparks their trains emitted or pay the full cost
of their activity. In effect, then, farmers were being forced by the legal
system to subsidize railroads.
Obviously, there must be some de minimis exception. Victims
should not be able to sue for a slight invasion of their property,
as when a single particle of pollutant, undetectable without ex-
pensive scientific instruments, crosses the victim's property line,
or where an airplane passes over an individual's property at a height
of 35,000 feet. This is a well-established legal principle, both in
England and the United States.33 This principle, sometimes
values are subjective. Philosophically, his position is utilitarian, which means that the
"common good" comes before rights. But, as deontological moral theory stresses,
rights come before the common good. Also, there is no way to determine what the
common good is in a pluralist society where individuals have different goals. Michael
Novak discusses this point in FREE PERSONS AND THE COMMON GOOD (1989). Kan-
tians would be quick to point out that to hold the individual good to be subservient to
the common good is immoral because individuals would then be means rather than
ends. Richard N. Langlois. makes some of these points in Cost-Benefit Analysis, En-
vironmentalism, and Rights, 2 CATO.J. 279 (1982). See also Walter Block, Coase and
Demsetz on Private Property Rights, 1 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 111 (1977).
32. "Rent-seeking" might be defined as seeking special privileges or protection
from government or getting others to pay for your benefits. For example, cable televi-
sion companies are rent-seekers when they attempt to obtain a government-protected
monopoly. Chrysler is a rent-seeker when it asks Congress to pass legislation that
prevents Japanese autos from entering the United States. Railroads are rent-seekers
when they ask government to absolve them of liability for the damage their locomo-
tives' sparks have done to farmer's property. For detailed analyses of rent-seeking,
see TOWARDS A THEORY OF A RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY (James M. Buchanan et al.
eds., 1980); THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RENT-SEEKING, supra note 25. However,
there are problems with using the phrase rent-seeking to indicate what is in effect
theft. First, it impugns. the ancient and honorable practice of paying and collecting
rent. The landlord has been under enough unjustified attack; we do not need to add
to it further. Second, rent-seeking has an alternative meaning, the attempt to gain as
much of the consumers' or producers' surpluses as possible from commercial activity.
What is wrong with that? This is the way of the marketplace and it is a mutually
beneficial enterprise. However, when the government is involved, it becomes an at-
tempt to seize resources from others against their will. This is essentially theft. It has
nothing to do with rent in either the economic or legal commercial sense. For further
information on this, see FREEDOM, DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC WELFARE: PRO-
CEEDINGS OF AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM 207 (Michael A. Walker ed., 1988).
33. Courts have traditionally refused to recognize minor invasions as nuisances
where the harm is slight and the conduct is reasonable. Jones v. Hayden, 37 N.E.2d
243 (Mass. 1941) (where a sidewalk is obstructed by a bale of hay); Graves v. Shat-
tuck, 35 N.H. 257 (1857) (where a highway is obstructed by moving a house); People
v., Transit Dev. Co., 115 N.Y.S. 297 (1909) (where there is smoke from an electric
power plant); Commonwealth v. Miller, 21 A. 138 (Pa. 1891) (where there was a pe-
troleum refinery and the nuisance was a matter of locality); Phillips v. State, 66 Tenn.
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called the "live and let live" rule, was elaborated on in Bamford v.
Turnley:34
The instances put during the argument, of burning weeds, empty-
ing cess-pools, making noises during repairs, and other instances
which would be nuisances if done wantonly or maliciously, never-
theless may be lawfully done. It cannot be said that such acts are
not nuisances, because of the hypothesis they are; and it cannot be
doubted that if a person maliciously and without cause made close
to a dwelling house the same offensive smells as may be made in
emptying a cess-pool, an action would lie. Nor can these cases be
got rid of as extreme cases, because such cases are properly used for
testing a principle. Nor can it be said that the jury settle such ques-
tions by finding there is no nuisance, though there is .... There
must be, then, some principle on which such cases must be ex-
cepted. It seems to me that principle may be deduced from the
character of these cases, and is this, viz., that those acts necessary
for the common and ordinary use and occupation of land and
houses may be done, if conveniently done, without submitting those
who do them to an action . ... . It is as much for the advantage of
one owner as of another; for the very nuisance the one complains
of, as the result of the ordinary use of his neighbour's land, he him-
self will create in the ordinary use of his own, and the reciprocal
nuisances are of a comparatively trifling character. The conven-
ience of such a rule may be indicated by calling it a rule of give and
take, live and let live .. .
Where the nuisance is slight,36 courts and legislatures might absolve
the perpetrator of liability, especially where no damage can be
proven. However, where the nuisance is more than slight, or where
there is measurable or detectable damage, courts should recognize lia-
bility and define the method by which the perpetrator is to be penal-
ized. It is critical that the legal system clearly define property rights
and how violations of property rights are to be dealt with. These deci-
sions should not be based on utilitarian or public policy considera-
151 (1874) (where there was a slaughterhouse near a highway). But the major ques-
tions to be answered are: when is the harm "slight," and when is the conduct "reason-
able"? To comply with the principle of corrective justice, these answers must be
based on individual rights, not on utilitarian or public policy grounds. The balancing
of interests doctrine has no place here. See also Murray N. Rothbard, Law, Property
Rights, and Air Pollution, 2 CATO J. 55 (1982), reprinted in ECONOMICS AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: A RECONCILIATION 233 (Walter Block ed., 1990).
34. 122 Eng. Rep. 27 (Ex. Ch. 1862).
35. Id. at 32-33. Richard Epstein also cites this quote in Nuisance Law: Corrective
Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, supra note 24, at 82-83.
36. In some cases, although the conduct of each of several perpetrators, individu-
ally, may be within the de minimis exception, the collective conduct may result in an
unreasonable interference and the courts have held that all perpetrators are liable.
See, e.g., Woodyear v. Schaefer, 57 Md. 1 (1881) (pollution); Woodland v. Portneuf
Marsh Valley Irrigation Co., 146 P. 1106 (Idaho 1915) (flooding); Sloggy v. Dilworth,
36 N.W. 451 (Minn. 1888) (flooding); Harley v. Merrill Brick Co., 48 N.W. 1000 (Iowa
1891) (smoke).
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tions, because private property rights would be disparaged and the
doors left wide open for rent-seeking by powerful special-interest
groups.
Epstein suggests that allowing private causes of action might be
counterproductive where the following four factors are present:
1. High administrative costs for claim resolution.
2. High transaction costs for voluntary reassignment of rights.
3. Low value to the interested parties of the ownership rights
whose rearrangement is mandated by public rule.
4. Presence of implicit in-kind compensation from all to all that
precludes any systematic redistribution of wealth among the in-
terested parties.37
Upon examination, one sees that pollution may be regulated by the
use of selected aspects of nuisance law. If the emissions are caused by
one individual and the trespass is committed against one individual,
the solution is simple.38 In such instances, the perpetrator and the
victim can be clearly identified and can negotiate a trade. The pol-
luter can pay the victim some mutually agreed upon price. If, how-
ever, the parties do not agree, the pollution will not be permitted. But
what about the many situations in which there is no easy solution?39
A great deal of pollution is the result of the "tragedy of the com-
mons." 4 In areas of common usage, such as lakes, streams, and air,
there is no private ownership right. Clearly, transferring these com-
37. Epstein, supra note 24, at 79.
38. Such nuisances are called private nuisances, as opposed to public nuisances. It
should be pointed out that the solution is simple only if property rights are recognized
and respected. In Ryan, property rights were ignored. 35 N.Y. 210 (1866). While the
Ryan solution also provided a simple solution, it was also unjust. Justice is to be
preferred over simplicity.
39. Individual victims often do not have legal standing to sue for a public nuisance
unless they have incurred some particular damage. National Audubon Soc'y v. John-
son, 317 F. Supp. 1330 (S.D. Tex. 1970). However, some state laws allow individuals
to sue in such cases when there is a "public interest." But in the absence of statutes,
individuals who have had their property rights violated often have no recourse if the
nuisance is deemed to be public rather than private. Additionally, courts have held
that victims may resort to self-help to abate a public nuisance only if they suffer some
special damage that other members of the public do not. Nation v. District of Colum-
bia, 34 App. D.C. 453 (1910); Brown v. Perkins, 78 Mass. (11 Gray) 89, 101 (1858);
Corthell v. Holmes, 32 A. 715 (Me. 1894). One way to strengthen property rights is to
expand the possibility of individual and citizen suits in cases in which an individual
can prove damage, without regard to whether the nuisance is public or private. For a
discussion of this topic, see Michael S. Greve, The Private Enforcement of Environ-
mental Law, 65 TUL. L. REV. 339 (1990).
40. For more on this point, see Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162
Sci. 1243 (1968); Robert J. Smith, Resolving the Tragedy of the Commons by Creating
Private Property Rights in Wildlife, 1 CATO J. 439 (1981). Hardin was not the first one
to recognize the tragedy of the commons. Aristotle recognized that property held
privately was taken better care of than that owned communally. See generally ARIS-
TOTLE, THE POLITICS, Bk. II, Ch. 5 (Carnes Lord trans., 1984).
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monly owned properties to private ownership41 could go a long way
toward resolving externality problems, since privately owned property
tends to be far less subject to ecologically destructive exploitation.
While it may not be politically feasible to privatize the Pacific, Ocean
in the near future,42 it is certainly possible to privatize smaller bodies
of water. Government-owned lakes could be sold to the highest bid-
der, or could be given to the natural homesteaders, whose land creates
the shoreline. In cases of multiple ownership of the lake, the owners
could form a cooperative or corporation to determine how the lake
should be used, for boating, fishing, recreation, etc. The owners could
charge a fee for the use of their lake. If someone was interested in
dumping waste on the property, the owners would be in a position to
regulate the terms of the agreement, determining the amount of per-
missible waste and the cost of the dumping. Conversely, if an environ-
mental group sought to completely prohibit dumping, the group could
negotiate an agreement with the owners, compensating the lost in-
come and obtaining a promise to prevent the dumping activity. Alter-
natively, the group could purchase the lake itself. In the case of
streams, similar arrangements could be made.
.Property rights in water have evolved over many years, and are
most highly developed in the western United States, where water, is
scarce.43 Much of the property law that has evolved in that area could
be adapted to a private property regime regulating pollution." Un-
fortunately, in the case of water allocation in the western United
States, state intervention has prevented the market from functioning
effectively. All too often, the government decides how water rights
41. For some examples that illustrate the beneficial effect of privatizing water on
the environment (and on economic growth), see Terry L. Anderson, The Market Pro-
cess and Environmental Amenities, in ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A REC-
ONCILIATION 137 (Walter E. Block ed., 1990); Walter Block, Institutions, Property
Rights and Externalities: The Case of Water Quality, in AGRICULTURE AND WATER
QUALITY: PROCEEDINGS OF AN INTERDISCIPLINARY SYMPOSIUM 191 (Guelph, Onta-
rio, Centre for Soil and Water Conservation, 1992).
42. Anderson and Leal discuss some of the possibilities and methods by which
oceans may be privatized. See ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 16, at 121. With mod-
ern technology, it may be possible to define property rights in oceans electronically
and by the use of lasers and sonar. See also Walter E. Block, Environmental
Problems, Private Property Rights Solutions, in ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT:
A RECONCILIATION 281 (Walter. Block ed., 1990); Block, supra note 41, at 191.
43. The development of water law in the West has by no means always resulted in
the strengthening of property rights. Indeed, in many cases, courts and legislatures
have prevented individuals from exercising property rights over water; thereby mak-
ing it impossible for markets to develop. Terry Anderson makes this point in The
Market Process and Environmental Amenities, supra note 41, at 141-44.
44. For source material on property rights in. water, see TERRY L. ANDERSON,
WATER CRISIS: ENDING THE POLICY DROUGHT (1983); WATER RIGHTS (Terry L.
Anderson ed., 1983); Terry L. Anderson & Donald R. Leal, Going with the Flow:
Marketing Instream Flows and Groundwater, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 317 (1988).
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should be allocated on the basis of interest group pressure, rather than
sound economics.45
Additionally, a similar system of property rights could evolve in the
area of auto emissions. Currently, nearly all roads and highways are
owned by the government, which once again creates a "commons"
problem. Yet, government ownership is by no means necessary.
Highways and roads could be turned over to private parties,46 who
might then establish rules for the use of their roads. Motor vehicles
emitting excessive pollution could lead neighboring households to sue
the owner of the road for nuisance. It is far easier to sue one of a
limited number of road owners than one of the virtually infinite
number of drivers. Therefore, private ownership could provide a
stronger incentive for the owners to regulate the amount of emissions
permitted on their property. Vehicles that pollute too much would
simply not be allowed to use the road or would be required to pay for
their pollution.
Moreover, the introduction of property rights has proven to be ben-
eficial to conservation in a number of other cases. For instance, there
is concern among some environmentalists and others that elephants
will become extinct if something is not done to prevent their slaugh-
ter. The solution has been to ban the ivory trade.47 However, such a
solution is ineffective because it does not make economic sense. If
ivory is banned, it will become more scarce, making trade in ivory
more lucrative. As a result, prohibiting the ivory trade will tend to
actually increase rather than decrease incentives. The fact that such
trade is illegal will attract individuals who have few scruples. If ele-
phants were privatized, that is, owned by individuals and private cor-
porations, the danger of their becoming extinct would be vastly
45. For more on this point, see ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 16, at 99.
46. For more on this point, see RANDALL FITZGERALD, WHEN GOVERNMENT
GoES PRIVATE: SUCCESSFUL ALTERNATIVES To PUBLIC SERVICES 163 (1988). Pri-
vately owned roads tend to be in better condition than government roads, and can be
maintained at much lower cost. Laredo, Texas sold about 150 city blocks to private
owners, with beneficial effects. A group of 113 corporations, developers, and busi-
nesses in Houston and Harris County, Texas have financed and built a large portion of
the area's road network. A number of other communities have privatized roads and
highways, which formerly were thought to represent a classic example of a public
good. But now, that classification has been drawn into question. If roads and high-
ways can no longer be automatically classified as public goods, is it possible that clas-
sifying all lakes and streams (and oceans) as public goods might also be incorrect?
Block, supra note 41. For more on the privatization of roads, see Walter Block, Pub-
lic Goods and Externalities: The Case of Roads, 7 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 1 (1983);
Walter'Block, Free Market Transportation: Denationalizing the Roads, 3 J. LIBERTA-
RIAN STUD. 209 (1979); Walter Block, Congestion and Road Pricing, 4 J. LIBERTA-
RIAN STUD. 299 (1980); Walter Block, Theories of Highway Safety, 912 TRANSP. RES.
REC. 7 (1983); MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, FOR A NEW LIBERTY 208 (1978); WILLIAM
C. WOOLRIDGE, UNCLE SAM THE MONOPOLY MAN (1970).
47. Fred L. Smith, Jr., Free-market eco-management: An alternative to ecological
central planning, CHEMTECH, Oct. 1991, at 598.
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reduced. One should note that such a solution is not mere utopian
polemics. There is empirical evidence to support it. In Kenya and
other East and Central African countries, for example, governments
resorted to a common property management strategy in which ele-
phants were owned by no one. As a result, the elephant population in
that part of the world has declined by more than fifty percent in the
last decade.48 Conversely, in Zimbabwe the elephants are privately
owned by regional tribal councils, who take an ownership interest. As
a result of their protection, the elephant population has actually
increased.
A comparison might also be made between cattle and bison. In the
"Wild West" period of U.S. history, bison were owned by no one and
thus, not surprisingly, were hunted down and killed indiscriminately,
to the very brink of extinction. They were not protected because they
had no owners. In contrast, cattle were privately owned by ranchers.
As Americans became more wealthy, they started to eat more meat
which, coupled with advances in technology and transportation,
greatly increased the demand for beef. Since cattle were always pri-
vately owned, their owners took an ownership interest by branding,
fencing their herds, guarding them,, and shooting rustlers. The law was
on their side because it was illegal to steal cattle. Government sup-
ported cattle owners in exercising their property rights, thereby avoid-
ing the "commons problem" that endangered bison. Could it be that
there is some relationship between private property rights and' the
danger of species extinction? Why is it that privately owned animals
such as chickens, dogs, cats and cattle are not in danger of extinction,
but wild animals like whales and bald eagles are? It is clear that the
solution to saving animals from extinction would be to privatize them.
While such a solution might be relatively easy to implement for
some species, such as bison, the privatization solution might be more
difficult for others like whales, dolphins, tuna and other migratory sea
animals.49 However, private ownership of such species is not impossi-
ble. In the short run, portions of some bodies of water could be priva-
tized so that only the owner would be permitted to harvest water-
based animals in a certain well-defined location. Selling the continen-
tal shelves, rivers and lakes might be feasible in the short-term. If
lakes can be sold to private parties, can the Mediterranean Sea be far
behind? In the long run, as technology improves, it might be possible
to fence off some larger 'areas, perhaps by laser or sonar technology,
so that animals from one sector would not travel onto another. Once
48. Id. at 599. See also Randy T. Simmons & Urs P. Kreuter, Herd Mentality:
Barring Ivory Sales is No Way to Save the Elephant, POL'Y REV., Fall 1989, at 46.
49. Private companies in Oregon have found a way to privatize salmon. When the
companies release the salmon from their hatcheries into the ocean, they imprint them
with a chemical odor that guides them back to the release site when they are ready to
spawn. Anderson, supra note 41, at 147.
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property rights are established, the market would tend to find solu-
tions to such problems.5 0 Yet, in the absence of property rights, there
is no incentive to even attempt to find solutions because there is no
payoff.
III. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS
Why is it that economists who usually favor pure or full free-mar-
kets opt instead for TERs when it comes to pollution?5' In some
cases, it is because they cannot visualize how a full private property
rights, free-market regime could actually function. At the very least,
this is an implication that emerges from reading works that do not
even discuss such an alternative.
In other instances, the market is rejected after what can best be
described as superficial coverage, almost an afterthought. There is,
however, at least one case where the market is considered in full de-
tail-and then rejected outright in an intensive and exhaustive analy-
sis. This is true of Edwin Dolan's work, Controlling Acid Rain.2
Dolan begins by describing what he takes to be the operation of a
private property system in its confrontation with acid rain. A true
Coasian, he offers two scenarios, one in which "ownership of the pol-
lution source [does] not convey the right to send clouds of noxious
gases into the neighbouring forest"53 and one in which it did convey
such a right. One need not concern oneself with the second system of
law, since despite the Coasian contention that, absent transaction
costs and wealth effects, either alternative will imply the same alloca-
tion of resources, this latter scenario would be antithetical to a Lock-
ean-oriented private property rights system. 4 For instance, if the
pollution source homesteaded the factory, and the forest owner in a
similar manner "mixed his labor" with the forest, the former would
50. For example, the market found an efficient way to make high quality, inexpen-
sive barbed wire in the nineteenth century because of the increased demand for fenc-
ing. Markets have a way of solving problems because the price system acts as a
signalling mechanism to draw attention to needs that are not being met.
51. This tendency, unfortunately, includes far more than environmental concerns.
Economists associated in the public mind with laissez faire capitalism have champi-
oned a whole host of quasi, demi, semi, market-"based" programs instead of free
markets. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, A PROGRAM FOR MONETARY STABILITY 91
(1960); FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, DENATIONALIZATION OF MONEY: THE ARGUMENT
REFINED (3d ed. 1990) (in favor of the "Ducat" based on a basket of precious metals,
commodity resources and fiat currencies-instead of embracing the gold standard,
the money chosen by the market in an era of competing currencies when people were
free to make such choices); See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 85
(1962); MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE To CHOOSE 150-65, 175-78
(1979).
52. Edwin G. Dolan, Controlling Acid Rain, in ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRON-
MENT: A RECONCILIATION 215-32 (Walter Block ed., 1990).
53. Id. at 216.
54. See generally JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett
ed., 1960).
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never obtain the right to send airborne pollutants to the latter. In the
words of Dolan:
[T]he forester would begin by demanding that emissions cease. In
response, the polluter might. stop the offending activity or install
control equipment that allowed production to continue without fur-
ther emissions. Instead, the polluter might offer a payment to the
forester in exchange for allowing continued emissions. If a payment
less than the cost of abatement turned out to exceed the forester's
evaluation of the damage, a deal would be struck along these lines.
As still another alternative, the polluter might offer to buy the for-
est outright and decide what to do about future emissions on the
basis of internal benefit-cost calculations. 5
However, Dolan rejects this market model (not "market-based
model," as he contends). 6 In the terminology we are employing, the
demand that emissions cease is a pure or full free-market solution. In
contrast, Dolan's own proposal, the TER, is characterized as being
"market-based," or a "quasi-market" alternative.
Dolan gives four reasons for his rejection of the market. First, Do-
lan addresses scientific uncertainties:
* The causes of Mount Mitchell's dying trees, New York's and
Canada's dead lakes, and Vermont's summer haze are not
known with certainty.
* Even if air pollution is accepted as the culprit, no one area's pol-
lution can be traced to a particular source.
• The property rights of the owners of pollution sources, the own-
ers of damaged properties, and other parties indirectly affected
are matters of dispute, and:
* Even if the first three points were resolved, the transactions
costs of private negotiations between numerous source owners
and numerous owners of damaged property would appear to. be
prohibitive. 7
Let us consider these four objections in turn. In the first case, the
uncertainty is due, our author informs us, to three factors. The first
factor is that more than one pollutant, in combination, may have
caused the problem, and therefore assessing the damage caused by
each individual pollutant "becomes difficult."5 However, this diffi-
culty alone does not justify rejecting a private property system upon
which western civilization may be said to be based. Certainly, our ju-
risprudence is set up to deal with the challenge of combined causes,
and effectively does just that in a myriad of other contexts. For exam-
ple, there is contribution among joint tort-feasors, where each defend-
55. Dolan, supra note 52, at 216.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 217.
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ant is apportioned a part of the blame, and the penalty is based on this
allocation.59
The second factor is that there are "non linearities and threshold
effects."6" It is worth quoting Dolan in full. on this:.
One such non-linearity concerns the formation of acid rain. The
rate of formation depends not only on the presence of precursors-
the Oxides of nitrogen and sulfur emitted by pollution sources-but
also on the presence of oxidizing agents, which promote acid forma-
tion, and alkaline substances, which retard acid formation. Depend-
ing on the presence of oxidizing and alkaline agents, an increment
of pollution might add greatly, slightly, or not at all to the acidity of
precipitation. Another threshold effect involves the "buffering"
properties of soils in areas where acid precipitation falls. Buffering
compounds in the soil may- for years prevent acid rain from doing
environmental damage. At some point, however, cumulative acid
deposition exhausts the buffering capacity and damage rapidly
escalates.
61
Alkaline substances and buffering compounds are not contributing
factors because they reduce the effect of the noxious airborne chemi-
cal. Therefore, the profit-seeker can have no real complaint about
them, they are an irrelevant complication. Oxidizing agents, however,
are a completely different matter. Such agents exacerbate the harmful
effects of the trespass, and in Dolan's view, it is improper for courts to
blame the polluter, who in fact, created only some of the harm, while
the rest of the damage was caused by. the oxidizing agent.
Nevertheless, legal precedents already address this objection. To
consider this, one can analogize the case of ordinary (human) trespass
to the intrusion of pollutants onto the property of the victim. In a
typical case, the thief breaks into the premises of the homeowner.
Unbeknownst to the intruder, the victim has a weak heart and is easily
frightened. In this example, the weak heart is analogous to the oxidiz-
ing agent, in that it amplifies the harm. As a result of the trespass, the
homeowner dies from a heart attack. Can the trespasser be found
liable for wrongful death? Yes, because of the doctrine of "you take
your victim as you find him."62
59. This does not imply agreement with the specifics of this aspect of jurispru-
dence on the part of the present authors, merely that multiple causation is no insepa-
rable barrier to a full private property solution to the problem of acid rain.
60. Dolan, supra note 52, at 218..
61. Id.
62. The classic example of this doctrine is where a man with an "eggshell skull"
died as the result of an injury that would have caused a mere bump on the head of a
normal man. See Dulieu v. White & Sons, 2 K.B. 669 (1901). This legal principle is
discussed in the "proximate cause" or "unforeseeable consequences" section of most
tort texts. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 262 (1971). See also McCahill v.
New York Transp. Co., 94 N.E. 616 (N.Y. 1911) (where man struck by taxi dies the
next day of delirium tremens, which was precipitated by the accident).
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Applying this principle in the pollution context, the polluter should
be forced to "take the atmosphere as the polluter finds it." If oxidiz-
ing agents worsen the harm of the emissions, the polluter should, in
like manner, be held responsible for the entire damage, both the part
created by his or her pollution, and that portion caused by the oxidiz-
ing agents in the air. Any number of factors may exacerbate the dam-
age caused by the polluter. In another of Dolan's examples, moss may
be the contributing factor. As Dolan explains:
[A]cid rain does not kill trees directly. The mechanisms involved
may be quite complicated. To give one example, Lee Klinger, work-
ing with the National Center for Atmospheric Research in Boulder,
Colo., sees a link between forest diebacks and certain mosses that
are nearly always present in dying forests. The mosses produce or-
ganic acids that mobilize aluminum naturally present in the soil,
forming compounds toxic to the feeder roots of trees. Although the
mosses are naturally present in most forests, their growth appears to
be greatly promoted by acid precipitation.63
Dolan then considers the transportation problem:
Even if the available evidence linking environmental damage to
pollution is accepted, there remains the problem of tracing the acid
rain at a given site to a particular source of pollution. To date, re-
search on transportation models for pollution has been able to give
only general, probabilistic answers. In general, pollution is known
to travel from west to east, which is unfortunate in that the largest
concentrations of emission sources are in the midwestern United
States, and the most vulnerable environments along the eastern sea-
board. Some pollution is thought to cross the U.S. - Canadian bor-
der, often from south to north, but in the cases of some emitters in
Ontario, it travels from north to south. Pollution from sources in
the east is often blown out to sea, where the resulting acid precipita-
tion is thought to be relatively harmless.
Incomplete knowledge of pollution transportation pathways is a
significant complication in devising regulatory solutions to the acid
rain problem. It is an even more serious barrier to implementing
market-based pollution control efforts. Unless it is known where
the pollution from a given source travels, there is no way to know
who is entitled to enjoin whom, who should negotiate with whom,
or who should compensate whom.
It has been suggested that major pollution sources could be re-
quired to tag their emissions with distinctive combinations of iso-
tope markers that could be read at downwind sites subject to acid
precipitation. If technically feasible, that would certainly clarify
some of the transportation issues. However, the problem would re-
main that shifting atmospheric currents would mix pollutants and
deposit them in constantly changing and unpredictable patterns, so
that a system of compensation founded on the transportation path-
63. Dolan, supra note 52, at 218.
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ways of a base6period would not necessarily remain valid for subse-
quent periods.
In this instance, the first problem is the inadequate treatment Dolan
gives to the isotope solution. He overstates the importance of chang-
ing wind conditions that deposit pollutants in "constantly changing
and unpredictable patterns." Criminals first rob people in neighbor-
hood A, then in B, then in C in "constantly changing and unpredict-
able patterns." Does this mean that our society should not pursue
criminals, wherever they operate?65 Thus, Dolan's analysis implies a
greater obstacle than is realistically presented.
Additionally, another difficulty is presented by the nearly complete
failure of the development of the discipline of environmental foren-
sics. Forensic medicine, in contrast, is a growing and healthy science.
The forces of law and order are now able to trace perpetrators based
on the tiniest bit of identifiable blood, semen, saliva or flesh, remain-
ing on the bodies of their victims. Suppose however, that laws against
murder had never been imposed. It is unlikely, in the extreme, that
these capabilities would have been developed.
Something of this sort seems to have occurred in regard to airborne
pollutants. Since the 1830s, 66 it has been legal for soot particles to
trespass onto the property of other people; this is true for reasons
compatible with, although by no means the same as, those offered by
Dolan. Now reverse this situation, and suppose that the jurisprudence
in effect until the 1830s (a period of strong property rights, where pol-
luters were subject to fines, injunctions, and so forth) had continued to
the present day. We would have long since been blessed with a robust
and accomplished industry dedicated to environmental forensics. This
discipline would have been fully capable of discharging the obligations
that Dolan "regrets" we cannot do. In those earlier times, the chemi-
cal and atmospheric difficulties posed by Dolan would have been eas-
ier to deal with-matched by the lesser scientific capabilities of that
epoch. The present challenges appear so daunting precisely because
we are bereft of some 150 years of research and development that
would have taken place had the law upheld the victims' property
rights in that bygone era.
Dolan's third objection to the free enterprise system is perhaps his
weakest. It consists solely of the claim that there are disputes as to the
property rights of the polluters. The implication is that until these
disputes are resolved we cannot go ahead and implement the law of
trespass. While conceding that the common or natural law view is that
people have a right "to exclude pollutants from their air space,"67 he
64. Id. at 218-19.
65. It is likely that the winds are more predictable than the geographical doings of
criminals.
66. See HORWITZ, supra note 26, at 53.
67. Dolan, supra note 52, at 219.
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asserts that "counterclaims can be made that are difficult to dismiss
out of hand."6
Obviously, there are difficulties with this view. Even if it were true,
it by no means follows that the usual structures concerning private
property rights could not be implemented with regard to acid rain.
There are "disputes" about practically everything-but if we were to
allow these disputes to deny the application of the law, we would be in
a very sorry state indeed. In any event, it simply does not follow that
Dolan's "common-law, weakened-by-disputations" theory would, be
inferior to the TER scheme.
Fortunately, we need not press on to a cost-benefit analysis of these
two alternatives. It is reasonably easy to dismiss out of hand all of the
arguments created, manufactured, or discovered by Dolan. Let us now
consider them:
[M]idwestern utilities are joined by producers of Appalachian high-
sulfur coal. The coal interests point out that they have made long-
lived investments and entered into long-term contracts to supply
fuel to utilities. These contracts met all environmental regulations
in force at the time they were entered into. To change the rules of
the game now would impose job and revenue losses that should not
go uncompensated.69
Clearly, it is easy to dismiss this argument, since its echoes the logic
of a comparable argument that might have been made by Confederate
slave owners after they lost the Civil War. Conceivably, plantation
owners could have asserted a claim that because the initial purchase of
slaves was legal, they had a vested right in slave ownership. Similarly,
Dolan's argument on behalf of the midwestern utilities, 70 that point
sources causing pollution are permissible simply because they were
built "in accordance with all federal and state... standards in force at
the time [that these events occurred]"'" is unpersuasive. Slavery,
although legal at one time, did not warrant an extension of slave
owner "rights" any more than utilities hold "first in time" rights.
Put in this context, it is easy to see the fallacy of the argument.
Utilities, like slave owners, were given "rights" which clearly did not
belong to them as a matter of natural law.72 It is gross legal positivism
of the worst sort to insist, as does Dolan, that because a legislature
saw fit to enact certain rules, that they have any proper force.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 219-20.
70. Id. at 219.
71. Id.
72. We are implicitly assuming that when these polluters began their operations,
they invaded the private property rights of other people. However, there may be
some cases where the utility companies were located in an area first. If so, then ac-
cording to the Lockean homesteading doctrine we espouse, the polluters have legiti-
mate warrant to continue. The newcomers must take the air conditions as they found
them.
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.The second part of this argument, the complaints made by the pro-
ducers of Appalachian high sulfur coal, may also be dismissed by an
analysis similar to claims that could have been made by those engaged
in the business of supporting the slave trade. Rather than being com-
pensated, the slave owners and those in dependent industries should
have been subjected to the severest penalties of the law. Similarly,
claims for compensation by the midwestern utilities and Appalachian
coal are an outrage, and should be "dismissed out of hand." The real
issue is whether, and to what extent, they should. be penalized.
Finally, Dolan discusses transaction cost considerations:
Consider a simple example. Suppose I am looking for a piece of
land on which to build a drag strip. In doing so, I must face the
possibility that although some people would consider a
neighbourhood drag strip an amenity, others are likely to consider it
a nuisance. Fortunately, there are many possible sites for the strip.
Some will be large enough that noise from the strip will not carry
beyond the property'line, although, of course, it will be costly to buy
so much acreage. Alternatively, there will be smaller, less expensive
sites where I can first negotiate an option to buy, and then negotiate
with the neighbours regarding compensation for the noise. Through
a process of competitive bargaining in which I simultaneously nego-
tiate with owners of various drag-strip sites and with the neighbours
of those sites, I finally settle on the alternative that is least costly to
me. Because all externalities have been internalized through the
competitive bargaining process, that will also be the most efficient
solution from the point of view of the community as a whole.
'Regrettably, quite aside from the scientific and legal uncertain-
ties, the drag-strip model is not workable in the case of acid rain.
Two features of the acid rain case enormously raise the transaction
costs of a privately negotiated agreement. One is the fact that the
number of parties involved is far greater-dozens of electric utili-
ties, thousands of smaller industrial pollution sources, and millions
of downwind property owners. The other is the fact that the pollu-
tion sources that cause the greatest concern are already in place, as
are their sources of fuel supply, their customers, 'and their work
forces. Thus, in place of the ex-ante competitive bargaining of the
drag-strip model, the acid rain issue involves ex-post bargaining
among parties who are already locked into inflexible relationships
with one another by virtue of non-redeployable, site-specific invest-
ments. These circumstances encourage individual parties to play
the free-rider if they are on the paying side or to hold out for a
greater share of the potential gains from any agreement if they are
on the receiving side. If free-riders, holdouts, and the sheer prob-
lem of numbers inflate transaction costs to the point where they
exceed the potential gains from an agreement, nothing will be done.
What is meant by "doing nothing" depends,'it should -be noted,
on how property rights issues are resolved. If utilities' claims to free
use of the airshed are upheld, then doing nothing means letting pol-
lution continue unabated, even if the marginal gains from pollution
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abatement exceed the marginal costs of abatement. If the claims of
downwind landowners are fully upheld against the polluters, then
"doing nothing" means no pollution. Sources must either shut
down or install equipment that will reduce pollution to an im-
perceptible level, even if at that opposite margin, marginal abate-
ment costs exceed the marginal benefits of abatement. Neither
extreme is optimal, viewed apart from transaction costs. 73
Although, this is perhaps the strongest of his four arguments, it too
is flawed. Initially, Dolan severely underestimates the ability of the
market to internalize externalities, or, in his own terminology, to con-
vert the acid rain situation into one approximating that of the "drag
strip." Dolan unduly minimizes the effects of socialistic acts of gov-
ernment in other sectors of the economy in rendering problems in this
part more intractable. A case in point is the large number of con-
tracting parties, millions of automobile owners, who pollute the at-
mosphere. However, if government were to allow private ownership
of streets, roads and highways,74 the numbers would be reduced--at
one fell swoop-from several million to perhaps several dozen.
The point is that under private ownership, no one would sue the
individual automobile owner-drivers. Instead, responsibility would
rest with the highway corporation, for running, as it were, a "pollution
bawdy house." One of the reasons this legal scenario is dismissed out
of hand is the impracticality of suing millions of people. However,
privatization renders the objection less telling.
The common-law tradition that is the basis of this Article, would
not interpret "doing nothing" as "letting pollution continue un-
abated." It would still fall short of a "no pollution" standard, the only
other option offered by Dolan. More precisely, while natural law
would not allow any pollution violating private property rights, it
would allow any and all emissions that do not amount to a trespass.
How could emissions into the air be justified on this basis, given
large numbers of transactors (although not as many as in Dolan's sce-
nario), hold outs, free riders, and so forth? Dolan himself has detailed
or suggested several options including: scrubbers, isotope marker
emission tags, and cleaner burning fuels.
Furthermore, property rights themselves can come to the rescue,
paradoxically, from the perspective of the "first in time" concept we
rejected above. We rejected this argument earlier because the
"rights" given out by the government to the utility polluters were ille-
gitimate. They were established by arbitrary state edict. There is,
73. Dolan, supra note 52, at 220-21.
74. See FITZGERALD, supra note 46, at 163. See generally supra note 46 and ac-
companying text.
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however, a legitimate source of these rights: the Lockean homestead-
ing principle. 75
How would this work? Suppose, for instance, that a factory had
been polluting an area of nine square miles, while claiming ownership
over only a central core of one square mile. Subsequently, other peo-
ple moved into the additional eight square miles after the factory
emissions had commenced. Under these circumstances, the firm
would own the property rights to its one square mile, but would also
own the pollution rights to the other eight square miles. According to
Dolan, this would not be due to legislative legerdemain. On the con-
trary, it would flow from the Lockean insight that he who first uses a
previously non-owned resource obtains legitimate ownership rights
over it. This is, after all, how the factory established its title over the
one central square mile. Under these conditions, the amount of pollu-
tion that would ensue under a property rights standard would, con-
trary to Dolan's assertion, result in significant pollution.
Moreover, the "holdout" problem depicted by Dolan is unsatisfac-
tory. Undoubtedly, the very terminology employed here implies that
the holdout doesn't "really" value his homestead, peace and quiet, or
clean air, let alone at the elevated level he says he does, that the indi-
vidual is merely "holding out" for greater financial remuneration. Yet
how can Dolan, or any other outside observer, know this? On the
contrary, if preferences are subjective, one cannot treat the holdout
any differently than the market participant with a reservation price for
his or her property.
That being said, it is by no means impossible, as claimed by Dolan,
to solve the problem of possibly strategic behavior. In order to com-
prehend this, one need only reflect upon the concept of options. A
factory is attempting to locate in a place where there will be hundreds,
if not thousands, of pollutees. It need not commit to that one area.
Instead, it could purchase options to buy smoke emissions rights, at
stipulated prices, at some half dozen places. Then, if holdouts are dis-
covered in two or three of these areas, they can be played off one
another.
There is still further difficulty with Dolan's position. He argues that
transaction costs are unacceptably high. His proposed solution lies
not in a market in property rights, but instead a "quasi-market"
scheme of TERs. However, transaction costs, like all other costs, are
amenable to being reduced. This reduction can only occur however,
if, and only if, markets are allowed to function freely.
Historically, the initial costs of computers, televisions, and
automobiles were exceedingly high. These products were initially
priced out of reach of the middle class. In time, however, due to spe-
75. LOCKE, supra note 54; HOPPE, supra note 6, at 134; ROTHBARD, supra note
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cialization, division of labor, investment, and so forth, these costs were
all markedly reduced. If transaction costs are ever to follow this pat-
tern, property rights, must not be permitted to ride roughshod over
them, as in the MPP proposal.
This author's public policy recommendation, then, must be viewed
as a recipe for the very market failure it decries. Without upholding
the claims of downwind landowners against polluters (who do not own
the requisite pollution rights), a market in these rights is rendered all
the less likely.
Essentially, Dolan is mired in a static model, in terms of both trans-
action costs and smoke abatement technology.76 Consider for exam-
ple, the open-ended smokestack. Open-ended, that is, to the air and
thus to the property of other people. Is it difficult to imagine the re-
sult if, in the 1830s, the legal regime of property rights had not been
overturned. We would have long ago begun enjoying a nonpollution
intensive technology where there were no open-ended smokestacks.
Instead, these pipes would have lead back to chemical cisterns, the
latter to capture otherwise errant soot particles.
Dolan ends his analysis with an obeisance to cost-benefit analysis.
As we have seen, this concept is fundamentally defective. Utility for
different people is not comparable. How does Dolan know that at the
"opposite margin (upholding victim-landowner rights) marginal
abatement costs exceed the marginal benefits of abatement?" He
cannot know, nor can he adduce any evidence for this conclusion.
The beauty of the property rights approach, in contrast, is that it
need not become mired in these subjective quicksands. It assigns
property to its rightful owners, and places the burden of purchase on
those who would alter these allocations.
CONCLUSION
In short, the introduction of marketable trading permits into envi-
ronmental economics is a major innovation. These permits allow
"market" forces to be unleashed into what would otherwise be a com-
mand system. Marketable trading permits result in a much more effi-
cient allocation of resources, which makes it possible to have both less
pollution and lower operating costs.
However, they suffer from a major structural deficiency because
trading permits are, in effect, a license to pollute, and thus, a license to
violate property rights. A true market regime seeks to recognize
rather than ignore property rights. The problem with recognizing
property rights in this area of environmental economics is. that air,
water, roads, many forests, and so forth, are publicly owned, which is
effectively no ownership. As a first step toward implementing a true
market regime, we must find ways to privatize these "commons" so
76. This applies to most traditional economic commentators on this issue.
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that market forces will be able to operate to reduce pollution and
Costs. A great deal of research remains to be done in this area and
now that the problem has been identified, there is a clear direction for
that research.

